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by Katy Jacob, research specialist, and Bruce J. Summers, former director, Federal Reserve Information Technology, and independent 
consultant on payments systems and technology management
The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago will host its eighth payments conference on 
June 5–6, 2008. The conference will highlight threats to the security of the payments 
system and explore solutions to those challenges. This article previews issues that 
will be covered at the conference.
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For more information on 
the conference, see 
www.chicagofed.org/
paymentsystems or contact 
Katy Jacob at (312) 322-2915 
or kjacob@frbchi.org.
One of the key roles of the Federal Reserve 
is to promote the integrity and efﬁ  ciency 
of the U.S. payments system.1 This mis-
sion takes on many forms, and encom-
passes ﬁ  nancial services, supervisory 
activities, the Fed’s public policy function, 
and economic research. The Federal 
Reserve System provides retail payments 
services on behalf of the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury and clearing and settle-
ment services to depositories; helps set 
payments policy; provides consumer pro-
tections; and regulates the payments 
activities of banks around the country.2
A key component of maintaining the 
integrity of the payments system includes 
risk mitigation and fraud management. 
Since the very ﬁ  rst incidents of counter-
feit currency, the payments industry has 
faced a variety of security-related chal-
lenges. Concerns related to payments 
security have escalated in recent years. 
As payments shift away from paper-based 
forms toward electronic instruments, con-
sumers face an increasing array of pay-
ments options that entail different fraud 
risks. The Fed plays an active role in iden-
tifying new trends in payments fraud and 
developing effective ways of implement-
ing responses to those trends. 
Payments fraud: Past, present, and 
future
Fraud is a very real threat to the payments 
system’s efﬁ  ciency, which is measured 
by the quality of its operational perfor-
mance and cost.3 According to one recent 
survey, 71% of ﬁ  nancial institutions re-
ported instances of payments fraud in 
2007, and 37% of those ﬁ  rms reported 
ﬁ  nancial losses stemming from the fraud-
ulent activity.4 Fraud degrades operational 
performance and increases cost—not 
only for the parties to the transaction(s) 
whose payments are disrupted but also 
for the payments system as a whole. 
While older payment forms, such as 
checks, have always been vulnerable to 
fraud, newer electronic forms have 
opened up a more complex array of 
opportunities for fraud and data theft; 
these are related to the more open 
nature of twenty-ﬁ  rst-century electronic 
information and recordkeeping. More-
over, the number and type of players in 
the payments industry is growing, as 
nonbank companies, such as Wal-Mart, 
compete directly with ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions by offering payments services. All 
of these changes have led to an increas-
ingly complex security environment for 
payments providers, merchants, consum-
ers, and the public sector. Various players 
must discern whether new payment types 
carry excessive fraud risk; who is liable 
when payments fraud occurs; how losses 
are allocated; what consumer protections 
should be in place; and how standards 
should be deﬁ  ned to lessen the incidence 
of fraud. While everyone might agree While some economists and practitioners consider the current 
state of fraud containment in the retail payments marketplace 
to be sufﬁ  cient, others question this assessment.
on the fundamental importance of re-
ducing fraud in the payments system, 
there are differing philosophies about 
how to achieve this goal. 
The role of the market
Payments practitioners have an imme-
diate incentive to reduce fraud in order 
to remain proﬁ  table and to avoid rep-
utational and regulatory risks associated 
with fraud losses. Industry participants 
recognize that security is hard to achieve 
and ensure. Security is expensive to pro-
duce; therefore, it can result in indirect 
but nonetheless real costs to consumers. 
For this reason, cooperation across the 
supply chain is not only desirable but 
also necessary to achieve efﬁ  cient out-
comes for consumers. Institutions that 
are trying to manage payments fraud lev-
els face constant change as they attempt 
to keep abreast of new technology and 
security needs. Regardless of the fast 
pace of change, participants in the pay-
ments system recognize the importance 
of effective fraud reduction strategies, 
since the banking and payments indus-
tries depend on reputation and trust 
for their success. 
Many payments practitioners and some 
economists argue that the payments 
system performs quite well in respond-
ing to fraud risks; therefore, they favor 
a private market approach to fraud con-
tainment. This view of retail payments 
system fraud was represented by the di-
verse cross section of participants in a 
2007 roundtable on the subject spon-
sored by the Federal Reserve Board’s 
Payments System Policy Advisory 
Committee.5 The roundtable, which in-
cluded representatives of banks, nonbank 
payments providers, payment card com-
panies, and technologists, offered a va-
riety of views but also reached a broad 
consensus on some important points. 
There was consensus that the current 
level of payments fraud is being effectively 
managed; however, organizations must 
constantly adapt to keep pace with crim-
inal activity, technology-driven change, 
and innovation in the payments system. 
Roundtable representatives concluded 
that it would be impossible to eliminate 
fraud completely. They noted that fraud 
prevention initiatives must balance costs 
and beneﬁ  ts and that payments practi-
tioners have different incentives moti-
vating their fraud resolution measures. 
While the roundtable representatives 
indicated that the dollar value of fraud 
relative to business revenue is declining, 
their business costs for fraud mitigation 
are both substantial and trending up-
ward. An especially interesting consensus 
emerged: The instrument that is the prin-
cipal source of fraud losses on a compar-
ative basis is the traditional paper check, 
as opposed to more recent electronic 
payment innovations.6 
Roundtable participants also spoke about 
the impact of e-commerce. The Internet 
allows fraud directed at the U.S. pay-
ments system to originate anywhere in 
the world. This technological innovation 
has turned payments security issues on 
their head: In a classic bank robbery, the 
crooks tunnel into the bank from a lo-
cation next door, while on the Internet, 
everyone is virtually next door. 
Overall, participants agreed that, while 
protecting consumer information is clear-
ly a responsibility of payments providers, 
it is also important to encourage and 
help consumers to follow good security 
practices. The roundtable concluded that 
fraud detection and prevention would 
improve through more industry-wide in-
formation sharing and collaboration, 
greater use of enhanced authentication 
technologies, and more widespread adop-
tion of the Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard, also known as PCI.7 
The consensus reached by the round-
table is supported by the results of an 
earlier survey of approximately 100 large 
nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms that actively use a 
variety of payments services.8 In the sur-
vey, each ﬁ  rm identiﬁ  ed its most impor-
tant payments processing requirements. 
While participating ﬁ  rms generally re-
sponded that controlling fraud is critically 
important, a relatively low percentage 
responded that they are dissatisﬁ  ed with 
the ability of current payment methods 
to control fraud. Consequently, other pay-
ment improvements, such as the ability 
to track transactions, emerged as need-
ing higher-priority attention than fraud 
containment. Thus, many payments 
participants noted that, while payments 
fraud is an inherent concern, it is one 
that can be effectively managed if the 
private sector makes the necessary ﬁ  nan-
cial and time commitments.
Is more intervention needed?
Some would argue that a more active 
public sector approach may be required 
to ensure the most effective and efﬁ  cient 
operation of the payments system. Pay-
ments systems and markets are thought 
of as special because they entail network 
effects. As network industries, payments 
systems operate most effectively when 
many large and small players are in-
cluded. Payments networks also exhibit 
externalities, meaning that the costs 
and/or beneﬁ  ts associated with payments 
services are not always recognized by the 
parties to commercial transactions. In 
addition, the markets may suffer from 
asymmetric information—i.e., the sellers 
and buyers of payments services may not 
be equally well informed about the risks 
associated with a particular payments 
service. Authentication is one such 
asymmetry in the payments market.
While some economists and practitioners 
consider the current state of fraud con-
tainment in the retail payments market-
place to be sufﬁ  cient, others question 
this assessment. It is important to note 
that smaller payment ﬁ  rms, merchants, 
and other participants often look to the 
government to ensure equity in the pay-
ments system and to help control pay-
ments fraud. This might be accomplished 
by issuing regulations that specify dis-
closures required for payments service 
security, by enforcing those and other 
regulations, and possibly by facilitating 
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desired effectiveness and efﬁ  ciency out-
comes for the payments system. 
Some recent economic analyses suggest 
that current market incentives and mech-
anisms are not up to the task of contain-
ing fraud to a degree that optimizes 
overall payments system effectiveness and 
efﬁ  ciency. One recent research paper 
shows that nonbanks currently play an 
important role in retail payments systems 
worldwide, especially in the U.S., and 
that this role is likely to continue to grow.9 
It argues that the growing prominence 
of nonbanks has increased operational 
risk, including data security risk and, by 
extension, fraud risk. The paper also 
raises concerns about systemic operational 
disruptions as a consequence of con-
centrating operations among fewer key 
nonbank payments services providers. 
Finally, the paper speaks to the banks’ 
role as “payments system gatekeeper” and 
to the inherent difﬁ  culties that banks 
have in fulﬁ  lling their role because the 
operational locus is shifting to nonbanks. 
While it is certainly true that the role of 
nonbanks in the retail payments system 
is increasing, it is not clear that this trend 
in itself results in greater operational 
risk. Electronic payments are among the 
most technology-intensive ﬁ  nancial 
services. The pace of change in the 
technology environment, and in fraud 
prevention in particular, requires pro-
viders to try to stay a step ahead of the 
fraudsters. Partnerships among banks 
and nonbank entities, if managed well, 
tend to strengthen, not weaken, the pay-
ments system. Also, it is not necessarily 
true that concentrating the supply of so-
phisticated operational services increases 
operational risk. Fragmented operations 
that perform poorly, or perform below 
a recognized standard, can be riskier than 
consolidated operations that perform at 
a higher standard—one that sufﬁ  ciently 
accounts for security, business continuity, 
and operational contingency arrange-
ments. Of course, operational cost is also 
a factor, in that electronic processing 
exhibits increased economies of scale.
Another research paper, written by a 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
economist, questions the notion that 
market solutions to payments fraud are 
adequate in today’s marketplace.10 This 
economist argues that the fraud control 
measures that were in effect during the 
paper payments era have not changed 
substantially in the electronic payments 
era, even though the threat now is inher-
ently much bigger. Her paper focuses on 
“transactional identity” and “information-
dependent transactions” involving non-
cash retail payments. It concludes that 
because of the problems with external-
ities and asymmetric information, the 
private marketplace will not contain 
identity theft to an efﬁ  cient degree and, 
as a result, the integrity and efﬁ  ciency 
of the payments system are at risk. 
This paper goes on to prescribe an active 
role for public authorities to ensure the 
integrity of transactions within the pay-
ments system. Some examples of public 
policy prescriptions to deal with market 
failure include disclosure rules to address 
the asymmetric information problem 
and laws to clearly and comprehensively 
assign liability to address the problem 
with externalities. However, one could 
also argue that the payments industry 
itself has a powerful incentive to develop 
effective and efﬁ  cient fraud control strat-
egies to keep up with new electronic 
payment platforms.
Conclusion 
It is clear that some participants and 
observers of the payments system believe 
that the problem of payments fraud is 
signiﬁ  cant but well within the power of 
the private sector to address. However, 
others challenge this position. They be-
lieve there is a need to evaluate the role 
of the public sector in protecting the in-
tegrity of the payments system as a whole, 
not just the integrity of individual service 
offerings. Others argue that there is merit 
on both sides of the debate. This view 
recognizes that payments security is best 
provided by the private sector, but that 
the public sector should play a vital role. 
The public sector should coordinate var-
ious parties and help foster conﬁ  dence 
in the overall payments system while dis-
couraging counterproductive practices 
that enhance opportunities for fraud.11 
We need to keep these different views 
in mind when attempting to size up the 
problem of payments fraud, propose ways 
to contain it, and provide implications 
for public policy. We must consider 
whether the private sector alone is able 
to do enough to contain fraud in a man-
ner that protects the payments system as 
a whole. We must also consider whether 
government intervention in fraud man-
agement might make matters worse, for 
instance, by reducing the efﬁ  ciency of 
the payments system—the perennial 
problem of unintended consequences. 
The integrity of the payments system 
becomes more important each day, as 
electronic real-time payments supplant 
conventional paper instruments, depen-
dencies on sophisticated technologies 
increase, and nonbanks play a greater 
role as providers of payments services. 
In this environment, it is conceivable 
that public policy institutions, including 
the Federal Reserve, might come to play 
a greater role in the payments system. 
In the meantime, the Federal Reserve 
can help to uncover the nature of the 
payments fraud problem by convening 
public forums on the issue.
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industry as a whole. To explore the com-
plex problem of payments fraud and 
methods for combating it, the Chicago 
Fed is pleased to host its eighth annual 
payments conference, Payments 
Fraud: Perception Versus Reality, on 
June 5–6, 2008. The conference will 
highlight threats to the security of the U.S. 
payments system and outline solutions. 
The conference discussions will focus 
on the following ﬁ  ve themes: identifying 
security issues in the retail payments 
system; preventing and containing pay-
ments fraud; allocating losses when 
payments fraud occurs; exploring fraud 
in emerging payment channels; and 
evaluating public and private responses 
to payments fraud. We look forward to 
lively discussions on the topics covered 
in this article.